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Presidential Election Laws and
Multipartism in Latin America
MARK P. JONES, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
This article examines the interaction between the rules governing
presidential elections and multipartism in Latin America. Data from 16
Latin American systems are examined through the use of a multivariate
model to gain an understanding of the independent impact of presidential
electoral formula (plurality vs. majority), the timing of presidential and
legislative elections (concurrent vs. nonconcurrent) and legislative district
magnitude on legislative multipartism, and by extension, on the number
of relevant political parties operating in the nation. The findings
demonstrate the strong and significant impact which formula and timing
have on multipartism. They also point to the importance of examining the
interaction between elections for different constituent institutions. Finally,
they underscore the applicability of Duverger’s law to presidential elections.
This study examines the interaction between the rules governing presidential
elections and multipartism in Latin American political systems. All of the
Latin American systems examined here possess presidential systems com-
bined with legislatures which are elected utilizing proportional representation
(PR).’ I hypothesize that within this framework (Presidential-PR), the rules by
which the president is elected have a strong impact on the degree to which
the presidential election is a two-party or multi-party contest, the number of
effective parties represented in the lower or single house of the national leg-
islature and, by extension, the number of relevant parties operating in the
nation. This study focuses on two prominent features of presidential elec-
tions : (1) whether the president is elected with a plurality of the vote or
whether (at least in the first round) a majority of the popular vote is required
for election, and (2) whether the timing of presidential elections is concurrent
or nonconcurrent with the election of the nation’s lower or single house.
NOTE: I am indebted to John E. Jackson, E. Terrence Jones, Ruth S. Jones, Warren E.
Miller, Matthew S. Shugart and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful com-
ments and suggestions. Errors remaining are solely the responsibility of the author.
1 The study examines lower/single houses only (hereafter often referred to as the legis-
lature).
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Previous studies have demonstrated that the level of multipartism in a
nation has a significant impact on the level of electoral volatility in that nation
(e.g., Remmer 1991). Other studies have discussed the importance of the
number of parties for factors such as governmental effectiveness and the rep-
resentation of interests (e.g., Lijphart 1984; Powell 1982). Most of the schol-
arly literature which has examined the determinants of multipartism has
been based on either parliamentary systems or on presidential systems with
legislatures elected utilizing plurality or majority single-member districts. But
to study those factors which affect multipartism in Presidential-PR systems
such as exist in Latin America, the impact of presidential election laws must
be examined.2
Shugart and Carey have hypothesized that both the electoral formula
used to select the executive and the timing of presidential elections have a
noticeable impact on the number of political parties in a nation (Shugart and
Carey 1992: 229). They examined the issues of formula and timing using
summary statistics from seventeen electoral systems. However, they did not
attempt to measure the independent effect of each variable. This study devel-
ops a multivariate model (based in part on Shugart and Carey’s hypotheses)
to examine the independent impact which formula, timing, and legislative
district magnitude have on legislative multipartism. This represents both an
extension and elaboration of Shugart and Carey’s work. The analysis is dis-
tinct from their work in three respects. First, and most significantly, in contrast
to the serial presentation of statistics employed by Shugart and Carey, a
multivariate model is utilized to gain an understanding of the independent
impact of formula, timing, and magnitude on multipartism, a subject on
which Shugart and Carey did not focus.3 Second, the study restricts its anal-
ysis to the impact of these variables in Latin American Presidential-PR systems,
which not only constitute an overwhelming majority of the world’s presiden-
tial systems, but also provide a relatively homogeneous population of nations
for analysis. Third, five Latin American systems not incorporated in the anal-
ysis of Shugart and Carey are included. In sum, through the utilization of a
multivariate model, a concentration on one particular set of presidential sys-
tems (one that is composed of the modal type of presidential systems), and
2 The premise that legislatures cannot be studied in isolation, particularly in presidential
systems, is an underlying theme of a recent work by Shugart and Carey (1992).
3 Two variables were excluded from the analysis after preliminary findings yielded null
results. One variable measured the presence or absence of a fused ballot where a single
vote registers support for both the presidential and legislative candidates. The other
variable measured the use of the highest average d’Hondt formula versus the largest
remainders Hare formula for the allocation of the legislative seats.
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the incorporation of additional cases; this article will expand on previous
work by seeking to identify the relative salience of formula, timing, and dis-
trict magnitude for the level of legislative multipartism in an electoral system.
Shugart (1988: 3) has offered the generalization that in presidential sys-
tems, &dquo;The presidential election imposes a single-seat nationwide district over&dquo;
the legislative elections. This impact would be expected to be particularly
strong in systems where the framework for the election of the president (by
plurality or majority formula and with a district magnitude of one) tends to
contrast with the rules governing the selection of the legislature (PR from
multi-member districts). In Latin America this contrast is present, and more-
over, the presidency is generally considered to be the dominant elected con-
stitutional institution. While there has not been a great deal of theoretical
work that has examined the relationship between electoral mechanisms across
institutions, we can infer from what has been written that there is good rea-
son to expect linkages to exist across these institutional boundaries. Thus we
would expect the rules governing the selection of the president to have a
strong impact on elections for other elected offices (e.g., the legislature) in
Latin American systems.
In his work on majority-runoff and plurality formulae Duverger con-
cluded that &dquo;the two ballot majority system tends to produce multipartism&dquo;
and that &dquo;the plurality rule tends to produce a two-party system&dquo; (1986: 70).
He focused primarily on the mechanical and psychological impact of electoral
rules for legislative elections on the number of parties receiving votes for and
represented in a legislative body. This article takes Duverger’s hypotheses one
step futher and examines the psychological impact of plurality versus majority-
runoff elections for the presidency on the number of parties represented in a
nation’s lower/single house.
This argument that the psychological effect of Duverger’s law goes beyond
the actual election it governs to affect elections for other political offices is
similar in logic to that of Blais and Carty who argued that &dquo;[t]he distribution
of votes in an election depends on the interaction between voters and parties,
and the latter’s strategy is as crucial as the former’s. Political elites and party
leaders will anticipate the mechanical and therefore the psychological effects
of electoral systems as much as voters will&dquo; (1991: 80). The impact of this
interaction between elections for two different institutions which utilize dif-
ferent electoral formulae (plurality/majority versus PR) and different magni-
tudes (single-member districts vs. multi-member districts) is intriguing. It
suggests that there is a second-order effect associated with Duverger’s law,
with the impact of the rule (primarily the pyschological effect) apparent not
only in the presidential elections, but also in the elections for the nations’
legislatures. I hypothesize that the psychological effect of either presidential
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election formula permeates the legislative electoral contests; has a strong effect
on legislative multipartism; and, by inference, affects other elections in the
nation as well as the general configuration of the national party system.
DATA, METHODOLOGY, AND MEASURES
The units of analysis for this study are 16 Latin American national electoral
systems (see Table 1). The data are the averages for the systems since the goal
of the study is to analyze the impact of institutional arrangements on repre-
sentation and the party system, a task which is best accomplished by exam-
ining systems, not individual elections.
# Table 1
LATIN AMERICAN SYSTEMS AND THEIR LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS INCLUDED IN THE STUDY
Note: Brazil IIa and lib represent the concurrent and nonconcurrent systems respectively of
the Brazilian Second Republic while Brazil III is the Brazilian Third Republic (for more infor-
mation see note 7).
(For information on the sources for the data used, see Tables 2 and 3.) There
were two criteria which had to be met for a system to be included in this
study. First, the nation had to be a democracy, a nation being considered
democratic if its government has been elected via open and competitive elec-
tions.4 A second criterion was that the systems be amenable to analysis using
4 The merits of this institutional approach toward the classification of democratic sys-
tems have been discussed by Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (1990: 6-9) as well as by
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the measures employed in the study.s Ordinary least squares (OLS) regres-
sion analysis, with a log-log functional form assumed to exist between the
independent and dependent (i.e., multipartism) variables, is employed.
Electoral formula is operationalized as a binary variable with the system
scored 0 if the executive is elected by a plurality vote (i.e., a relative majority
in which the candidate/party receiving the most votes in the first and only
round of voting wins the election) and 1 if the executive must receive an
absolute majority (over 50 percent of the popular vote) in the first round to
be elected. In the majority systems, if no candidate receives a majority in the
first round a runoff between the top two challengers is used in five of the
seven majority systems to select the president; in two systems however
(Bolivia and Chile), the president is then chosen by a majority vote in the
legislature (with the upper and lower chambers meeting in joint session).6
Remmer (1991). Remmer succinctly summarizes the logic of this institutional approach:
"Following the conventions established in the study of Latin American politics over the
course of the past two decades, democratic governance is defined here strictly in insti-
tutional terms, leaving open to empirical investigation questions regarding the conse-
quences of competitive institutions for popular participation in policy formation, socio-
economic equity, and other political outcomes" (1991: 796).
5 The Argentine system is excluded from analysis due both to its use of an electoral
college, which is distinct from either a plurality or majority system, and to the system’s
employment of both concurrent and nonconcurrent legislative elections. Colombia is
excluded from the multivariate portion of the analysis because legislative elections
occur an average of three months prior to the presidential elections and are thus neither
concurrent nor purely nonconcurrent. Elections for Uruguay which occurred during
that nation’s brief post-World War II experience with a collegial executive (1952-66)
are excluded from analysis.
6 Unlike the case in the pure plurality systems, the Costa Rican constitution specifies that
to be elected a candidate must receive more than 40 percent of the vote. Costa Rica is
however classified as a plurality system due to the low level of this threshold which
makes the system much more similar to plurality than majority systems. It should be
noted that in the 10 presidential elections which have occurred under the Costa Rican
1949 constitution, at no time has this 40 percent threshold not been surpassed. The
Peruvian constitution specifies that to be elected in the first round of voting a presi-
dential candidate must receive over 50 percent of the vote. For the 1980 election a
one-time exception lowered this threshold to 36 percent. Nevertheless, Peru is coded as
a majority system. Both Bolivia and Chile (only the pre-1973 system is examined) are
coded as majority systems. Theoretically Bolivia and Chile are considered to be similar
in their functioning to the majority-runoff systems. Like the majority-runoff systems,
both require that for a candidate to be elected in the first round he or she has to receive
an absolute majority of the popular vote and, also similar to the runoff systems, a
choice is made in the second round among the top finishers (two in all of the runoff
systems and Chile and three in Bolivia).
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Timing is operationalized as a binary variable with concurrent presiden-
tial and legislative elections being scored as a 0 and nonconcurrent presidential
and legislative elections scored 1. Concurrent elections are defined as elections
where the first or only round of the presidential election and the election of
the legislature are held on the same day. Nonconcurrent elections are defined
as elections where the popular selection of the legislature occurs in a separate
year from the election of the president.7 Average district magnitude (i.e., the
average number of representatives per electoral district) is calculated by divid-
ing the number of legislative seats by the number of legislative districts.8
Legislative multipartism is calculated utilizing a measure based on the
percentage of legislative seats won by the various parties in the lower/single
house elections (i.e., Laakso and Taagepera’s measure of the &dquo;effective number
of parties&dquo; in a party system [1979: 3-27] ).9 Legislative multipartism was
used instead of the most prominent alternative, electoral multipartism, for
two reasons.10 First, it better reflects party representation at the governmental
7 For Ecuador, only the 1978-79 and 1984 elections are included in the analysis. During
the period 1978-84 the Ecuadoran system had only concurrent presidential and legis-
lative elections. In 1979 the district-level legislative elections were held concurrently
with the presidential runoff while in 1984 they were held contemporaneously with the
first round of the presidential elections. Beginning in 1986 Ecuador also employed
midterm elections for the district-level congressional deputies which renders the post-
1984 Ecuadoran system un-amenable to the analysis used in this study. In the Brazilian
Second Republic the first two presidential and legislative elections (1945, 1950) were
held concurrently, while the latter three elections for the legislature (1954, 1958, 1962)
were held separately from the presidential elections. The Brazilian Second Republic was
divided into two separate systems: Brazil IIa which represents the elections of 1945
and 1950, and Brazil IIb which represents the elections of 1954, 1958, and 1962.
8 In four cases complex districting occurs. In Guatemala and Ecuador separate elections
are held at the district and national level; in El Salvador a two-tiered district framework
is employed (in 1991 only); and in Venezuela compensatory seats are allocated to
minor parties. Aided by the work of Taagepera and Shugart (1989: 269), an "effective"
magnitude was constructed for each system based on the geometric average of the
magnitude of the systems’ two levels or tiers. A similar transformation was conducted
for those systems which require that a party win a full electoral quotient in order to be
eligible to receive any seats in an electoral district (i.e., Bolivia in 1989 only, Brazil IIa,
Brazil IIb, Brazil III).
9 The equation used for the measure of legislative multipartism (N) is: N = 1/(1-F),
where N represents the "effective number of parties," F represents the index of fraction-
alization, and F = 1- the sum of the squared seat shares of each party. Since a log-log
functional form is employed (using logarithims to the base 10), the log values of the
legislative multipartism and average district magnitude measures are used in the quan-
titative analysis.
10 Electoral multipartism measures the effective number of parties in a system based on
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level, and hence the existence of relevant parties (though at the cost of over-
looking the presence of very minor parties). Second, it allows for the inclusion
of four systems which could not be analyzed if electoral multipartism were
employed.ll In any event, analysis of the available data revealed electoral and
legislative multipartism to be highly correlated (R-.97 for 11 cases), with
legislative multipartism consistently lower than electoral multipartism for all
systems.
The values for the multipartism variable have a reasonably continuous
distribution, with a mean of 3.71 effective parties and a standard deviation of
1.73. Values for this dependent variable range from a low of 2.05 (which is
the value for Nicaragua and corresponds to a little more than two effective
parties) to a high of 8.62 (which is the value for Brazil III and corresponds to
roughly eight and two-thirds effective parties). This distribution is illustrated
graphically in Table 2.
- Table 2
LEGISLATIVE MULTIPARTISM IN 16 LATIN AMERICAN ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
* This is Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) &dquo;Effective Number of Parties&dquo; measure. For more
information on its calculation, see note 9.
Sources: Archer 1991; Chang Mota 1986; CINAS 1991; Contreras 1986; Council of Freely
Elected Heads of Government 1990; Darlic Mardesit 1987; Delgado Fiallos 1986; Fabregat
1950, 1957, 1964; Hemandez Valle 1986; Honorable Corte Nacional Electoral 1990; Inforpr-
ess Centroamericana (Guatemala City), 11 January 1991, 4; International Foundation for Elec-
toral Systems 1992; Inter-Parliamentary Union 1981-1990; jimtnez et al. 1988; Jones 1993;
Leonard and Natkiel 1986; Listin Diario (Santo Domingo), 12 June 1990, 12; Mainwaring
1994; McDonald and Ruhl 1989; Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones 1990; Urzua Valenzuela
1986; Wells 1966a, 1966b.
the votes won by each party in an election, as opposed to legislative multipartism
which is derived from the number of seats won by each party in an election.
11 The Brazilian Second (IIa and IIb) and Third Republics and Peru would have to be
excluded if electoral multipartism were used. The widespread use of alliances in Brazil
where the vote is often recorded for the alliances, not the parties, prevents the use of
the Brazilian Second (IIa and IIb) and Third Republics. Lack of adequate vote data for
a majority of the Peruvian elections precludes the examination of electoral multipartism
for Peru.
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Finally, the degree to which the presidential elections of a system con-
form to a two-party framework is measured by summing the percentage of
the valid popular vote won by the top two candidates in the elections most
closely corresponding to those of the legislative elections examined in this
study. This measure is preferable to the &dquo;effective number of parties&dquo; measure
since the question being asked is whether the system conforms to a two-party
system, not how many parties compete in the election.
DATA ANALYSIS
Plurality versus Majority Presidential Electoral Systems
The distinction between plurality and majority systems has been a relatively
understudied aspect of electoral systems (Riker 1986: 28). Work in this area
by Duverger, most rational choice theorists, and to a lesser extent Riker, does
however provide support for the hypothesis that whereas plurality elections
tend to result in two-party systems, majority-runoff elections tend to lead to
multi-party systems (Shugart 1988: 2). Furthermore, Riker’s corollaries to
Duverger’s law do not seem to apply to Latin American presidential elections
(Riker 1986: 32). First, the election is a national one and thus Riker’s corollary
involving parties which are third nationally but one of the top two locally is not
relevant. Second, the presence of a Condorcet winner at the presidential level
in Latin American systems is doubtful, given the fact that the executive office
has been occupied by more than one party in all of the systems included in
the study during the period of analysis. This reality is inconsistent with the
hypothesis of a Condorcet winner in any of the systems in the study. If any
nation approached this level it would have been Chile in the 1960s with the
potential of the Christian Democrats becoming a Condorcet party between
the left and right; this of course did not occur. In the presidential election of
1970, Chileans elected the Socialist Salvador Allende who &dquo;would not have
received a majority of the vote in a two-way race&dquo; (Valenzuela 1978: 42).
The formula used to elect the president is hypothesized to have a strong
impact on the number of parties in a nation’s legislature. This strong impact
is considered to be the product of an interaction between the rational actions
of individuals who do not want to waste their votes in plurality elections
(with this factor indirectly influencing their vote choice in legislative elec-
tions, in part by limiting the voters’ realistic alternatives in the voting booth)
and the rational actions of party leaders who in plurality presidential electoral
systems tend to coalesce into larger parties than is the case in majority pres-
idential systems, since the principal electoral prize, the presidency, goes to
the plurality winner. Thus, given the regular occurrence of presidential elections
(in the absence of a Condorcet winner) there is less incentive in plurality (as
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opposed to majority) systems for most politicians to form alternative parties
whose probability of capturing the presidency is quite low.
This dynamic has been identified by Shugart and Carey as being linked
to strategic decisions of political elites in response to the electoral formula
used to select the executive. In plurality systems there exists a tendency
among party elites to &dquo;form a broad coalition behind the front-runner&dquo; as well
as when in opposition &dquo;to coalesce behind one principal challenger&dquo; (Shugart
and Carey 1992: 209). This contrasts with the majority-runoff systems which
&dquo;actually discourage the coalescence of opposing forces,&dquo; with political elites
making the decision to run their own presidential candidates with the goal of
either finishing in the top two in the first round, or else demonstrating an
electoral following that can be delivered in the runoff election to one of the
top two finishers in exchange for selective benefits in the future (ibid.: 210).
Strategic bargaining occurs among relevant political actors in all of the Latin
American presidential elections. When this bargaining occurs however depends
to a great extent on the electoral formula employed. In plurality systems it
takes place prior to the election whereas in majority systems it occurs after
the first round of elections (ibid.: 216). Consolidation prior to the election as
occurs in the former systems should result in a lower level of presidential,
and indirectly legislative, multipartism than should the post-first round bar-
gaining which occurs under the majority framework.
The sixteen Latin American systems examined are almost evenly split
between those which utilize a plurality selection process to select their exec-
utive (nine) and those that employ a majority system to select their executive
(seven). Due to the assumed differential psychological impact of plurality
versus majority systems on both rational voters and rational party leaders, we
would expect plurality presidential elections to be dominated by two parties,
with the first round of the majority system elections involving strong compe-
tition among multiple parties. This premise is confirmed by an initial analysis
of data for presidential elections corresponding to the legislative elections
included in the study.1 Presidential elections in the plurality systems tend to
be dominated by two parties, with the top two in the plurality systems aver-
aging 86.86 percent of the vote as opposed to the majority systems where the
top two parties average only 62.60 percent of the vote in the first round. This
relationship is illustrated graphically in Table 3 with the plurality systems
concentrated in the upper ranges and the majority systems falling (though
with less regularity) at the lower end of the scale.13
12 For Ecuador results from the 1988 and 1992 presidential elections (in addition to those
from 1978 and 1984) were used in this portion of the analysis.
13 An anonymous reviewer suggested that the anomalous status of El Salvador and Chile
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~ Table 3
PERCENTAGE OF THE VALID POPULAR VOTE RECEIVED BY THE Two LEADING PARTIES IN
FIRST ROUND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS FOR 15 PLURALITY AND MAJORITY LATIN AMERI-
CAN SYSTEMS
Sources: Europa Publications Limited 1 978-1 991 ; Jomal do Brasil, 22 November 1989; Keesing’s
1974-1992; McDonald 1971; Ruddle and Gillette 1972. For additional sources see Table 2.
The basic multivariate analysis combines the hypothesis of Duverger
(that plurality elections lead to two-party systems while majority systems
favor multi-party systems) with Shugart’s assertion that presidential elections
can have a strong impact on legislative elections in presidential systems. The
result is a prediction that, holding other factors constant, systems which
utilize the plurality presidential electoral formula will have lower levels of
legislative multipartism than will systems that employ the majority formula.14
By extension, and using legislative multipartism as a proxy for the national
party system, this choice of presidential election formula is hypothesized to
influence the number of effective parties in the nation as well.
As is seen in the OLS regression results presented in Table 4, the presi-
dential election formula (plurality or majority) does have a very strong impact
on the number of effective parties in the legislature, with a t-ratio (2.371,
11-df ) which is significant at less than .05 for a one-tailed test. 15
could be due to their use of nonconcurrent elections. These legislative elections might
be used by parties to test their electoral strength, with weaker parties then joining with
other (perhaps stronger) parties to support a common candidate in the next presiden-
tial contest. Subsequent analysis suggested that such a process did not occur in El
Salvador and was only partially present in Chile (where the timing of municipal elec-
tions was also important in this regard).
14 A slightly different version of this hypothesis is offered by Shugart and Carey (1992:
224-25).
15 The possibility of the existence of multicollinearity, especially between the formula and
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= Table 4
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES OF INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF LEGISLATIVE
MULTIPARTISM
# Note that the exponential of the estimated coefficient indicates the ratio of the expected
value of Y (i.e., the dependent variable multipartism) when the binary variable (either presi-
dential formula or election timing) equals one to the expected value of Y when the binary
variable equals zero. The district magnitude variable coefficient (as is the case with all con-
tinuous variables) is interpreted via its elasticity. In a log-log model however, one cannot
interpret the binary variable coefficients using their elasticities, and thus for purposes of inter-
pretation, the exponentials of the estimated coefficients of the binary variables are employed.
For more information on the interpretation of these coefficients, see notes 16 and 17.
Sources: See sources listed in Table 2.
Here, the presence of a majority system results in a level of multipartism
which is 1.500 times the level of multipartism of a plurality system (holding
other factors constant).16 For example, based on this model, in the Dominican
Republic (multipartism: 2.46, with a plurality formula and concurrent timing)
a 50 percent increase in multipartism from 2.46 to 3.69 would make the
Dominican Republic’s level of multipartism comparable to that of Guatemala
(multipartism: 3.80, majority formula and concurrent timing). This change
would amount to an increase of roughly one and one-fourth effective parties
in the legislature and to a three-column shift to the right in Table 2.
timing variables, was examined. These tests revealed low R-Squares when each inde-
pendent variable was regressed on all of the other independent variables, with the
highest R-Square being .182 (Lewis-Beck 1980: 58-62).
16 1.500 is merely the exponential of the estimated coefficient (i.e., Exponential 176 =
1.500). The value 1.500 indicates that the expected value of the multipartism variable,
when the presidential formula variable equals one (i.e., a majority system), is 1.500
times the expected value of the multipartism variable when the presidential formula
variable equals zero (i.e., a plurality system). Since logarithims to the base 10 are
employed, this exponential is given by 10 raised to the power of the estimated coeffi-
cient (0.176) for the formula variable. I am indebted to John E. Jackson for his advice
regarding the general use and interpretation of dummy variables in a log-log model.
52
In sum, these data in Table 3 and 4 provide strong support for the
hypothesis that the presidential electoral formula has a noticeable impact on
both the number of parties effectively competing in presidential elections as
well as on the number of effective parties represented in the legislature and
by extension in the nation. This implies that rules for elections for one con-
stitutional office have an impact on the nature of elections and representation
in other elective bodies.
Concurrent versus Nonconcurrent Presidential and Legislative Elections
There is strong theoretical support for the hypothesis that in Presidential-PR
systems the timing of presidential and legislative elections has a significant
impact on the level of multipartism in the latter elections (Shugart and Carey
1992: 226-53). Concurrent systems should be expected to have lower levels
of multipartism than is the case when the two elections are held at different
times when the restraining impact of the executive selection process is much
weaker.
Multivariate analysis provides solid support for the hypothesis that elec-
tion timing has a strong impact on legislative multipartism, with a t-ratio
( 1.924, 11-df ) which is significant at less than .05 for a one-tailed test. Table
4 indicates that the use of nonconcurrent elections results in a level of
multipartism that is 1.429 times the level of multipartism that occurs when
concurrent elections are used (holding other factors constant).17 Here the
model indicates that a 42.9 percent increase in multipartism in a system such
as Venezuela (multipartism: 3.18, plurality formula and concurrent timing)
would lead to an increase in multipartism from 3.18 to 4.54. This change
would result in a transformation of Venezuela’s party system (with slightly
more than three effective parties) to a situation very similar to that of Brazil
lib (multipartism: 4.54, plurality formula and nonconcurrent timing), with
the difference being the presence of roughly one and one-third more effective
parties in the legislature. On Table 2 this change would shift Venezuela three
columns to the right.
Analysis of Argentina’s system which experiences both concurrent and
nonconcurrent presidential and legislative elections provides further support
for the salience of timing for multipartism. In the concurrent elections Argentina
17 Similar to the case of the presidential formula variable, the value 1.429 indicates that
the expected value of the multipartism variable, when the election timing variable
equals one (i.e., a nonconcurrent system), is 1.429 times the expected value of the
multipartism variable when the election timing variable equals zero (i.e., a concurrent
system). This ratio is given by 10 raised to the power of the estimated coefficient
(0.155) for the timing variable.
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had levels of legislative multipartism which were much lower than the
multipartism of the nonconcurrent elections (2.39 vs. 2.62).18 These results
provide support for Shugart’s previous findings and demonstrate the salience
of election timing for multipartism in a nation.
District Magnitude
In an examination of 31 Anglo-European systems Arend Lijphart (1990: 488)
detected a small positive relationship between district magnitude and elec-
toral multipartism. A replication of Lijphart’s study using data from twenty-
two Latin American and Caribbean nations revealed the same positive relation-
ship, albeit in an even more limited status (Jones 1993: 66).
Table 4 reveals the impact of district magnitude on legislative multipartism
to be in the hypothesized direction, but not significantly strong. The estimated
coefficient (0.148, t-ratio: 1.408, 11-df ) does however reveal that district
magnitude influences legislative multipartism to a certain extent. This finding
should not be taken to imply that district magnitude is not a very important
structural factor in other contexts. For example, Lijphart (1985, 1990), Taagepera
and Shugart (1989), and others have repeatedly demonstrated the strong
salience of magnitude for the degree of proportionality of an electoral system.
DISCUSSION
Four important conclusions can be drawn from this study. First, Duverger’s
law does apply to presidential systems. The data clearly demonstrate that
Latin American systems which employ a plurality system to elect their pres-
ident have presidential elections which correspond much more closely to
those of a two-party system than do those systems which utilize a majority
framework and thus tend to have a larger number of parties effectively com-
peting in presidential elections. Second, the choice between a plurality and
majority presidential election formula has a strong impact on the level of legis-
lative multipartism and, by inference, on the number of relevant parties in
the nation’s party system. Plurality systems clearly possess lower levels of
legislative multipartism than do majority systems. Third, Shugart’s hypothesis
regarding the salience of presidential and legislative election timing was sup-
ported by these data. Systems in which these elections were held concurrently
have lower levels of multipartism than do those systems where these two
elections were held at separate times. Finally, district magnitude was found to
18 Argentina had concurrent presidential and legislative elections in 1983 and 1989, and
nonconcurrent legislative elections in 1985, 1987, and 1991. The source for these data
is the files of the Argentine Ministerio del Interior, Direcci&oacute;n Electoral Nacional,
Departamento de Estadisticas.
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have only a modest impact on multipartism, with the finding in the hypoth-
esized direction (positive), but not significant.19
The focus of this article has been on the impact of presidential electoral
rules on elections for the legislature. However, the potential impact of legisla-
tive electoral arrangements on presidential multipartism should be kept in
mind (Shugart and Carey 1992: 240). When examining the impact of legis-
lative election rules on presidential multipartism, one crucial variable is the
electoral formula, in particular the differential impact of PR formulae versus
the plurality formula. This variable, held constant in the Latin American
cases, probably goes a great distance in explaining the lower level of presi-
dential multipartism in Presidential-Plurality systems (e.g., Philippines 1946-69,
United States) than in the Presidential-PR systems.
The findings of this study point to the importance of examining the
interaction between elections for different constituent institutions. In at least
two instances (formula and timing) the electoral rules governing the selection
of the chief executive in presidential systems have a strong impact on the
degree of multipartism in a nation’s legislature and, more generally, on the
number of relevant parties operating in a nation’s party system. These effects
are both proximal and distal in nature, affecting both the results of the actual
elections and (potentially) the long-term nature of a nation’s party system.2o
The increasing popularity of the Presidential-PR and Premier-Presidential-PR
frameworks in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia (e.g., Namibia, Poland, Romania,
Senegal, Sri Lanka), as well as the Presidential-PR system’s continued presence
in Latin America, begs for a more complete understanding of the interaction
between the rules governing the selection process for the systems’ two most
important constituent units (the presidency and the lower/single house).21
19 While most of the results reported were quite strong, given the strength of the theoret-
ical argument, why were they not stronger? A partial explanation would be based
around four points: (1) many of the systems have only experienced a few elections
under the current rules, and it may take time for both voters and party elites to con-
form to the electoral rules through a learning process; (2) there are many electoral rules
(e.g., rules on party formation) which were not examined here but may influence the
level of multipartism in specific systems; (3) the small size of the population examined
increases the probability of partial outliers exerting a strong influence on the results;
and (4) many other factors (e.g., socioeconomic, religious, cultural, regional, ethnic) can
also affect the level of multipartism in a nation.
20 The political consequences of the number of legislative parties in an electoral system is
an important topic of inquiry. It is, however, beyond the scope of this article. For a
discussion of some important consequences, see Lijphart (1984), Powell (1982), Remmer
(1991), and Shugart and Carey (1992).
21 A majority of the more recent presidential systems are of the Premier-Presidential type.
While the same basic systemic effects which occur in the Presidential-PR systems are
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This research has demonstrated the relevance of presidential electoral
frameworks for the partisan configuration of a nation’s legislature. It has pro-
vided support both for previous work that examined the system-wide impor-
tance of certain presidential electoral arrangements for lower level elections as
well as for work which identified the salience of Duverger’s psychological
effect for the conduct of elections. Furthermore, it is apparent that the choice
of rules governing presidential elections is important not only for the outcome
of the election of the chief executive, but also for the elections of other repre-
sentative bodies, particularly the national legislature. These points should
therefore be incorporated into any discussion of presidential systems as well
as into any consideration of constitutional revisions or constructions, such as
are occurring in the 1990s throughout the world.
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